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THE PROPOSED UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE:
A NEW BOTTLE FOR OLD AND NEW WINES
ROBERT W. FOSTER*
A nine member committee composed of three state senators,
three members of the state House of Representatives, and
three members of the Judicial Council has been created by
a joint resolution of the General Assembly of South Caro-
lina to study and make recommendations with respect to the
Uniform Commercial Code.' The committee decided it would
be necessary to analyze each section of this code and consider
its effect on existing commercial law of South Carolina. To
that end the author of this article was appointed reporter of
the committee to assist it in the preparation of the study and
report. That study is presently proceeding apace and should
be available to the 1964 session of the General Assembly.
In the meantime, this discussion is designed to present a
general view of this comprehensive statute in order to intro-
duce members of the South Carolina Bar and other interested
persons to some of the new concepts and how they would
affect commercial practice. To accomplish this in the space
allotted, it is necessary to paint with a broad brush and ignore
detail except as it may be useful as illustrations. This is said
with some apology to those who may have had occasion to
explore the code in some depth, and thus may find this treat-
ment too cursory. A more detailed treatment including a
comparison with South Carolina law will be more appropriate
if and when the code is enacted into law.
BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION
The movement toward uniform commercial laws began in
the latter part of the last century with the principal impetus
coming from the increased volume of interstate commerce as
a product of the industrial revolution. The early manifesta-
*Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. No. 999, 1962 S.C. ACTS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS, 2323 (Feb. 9,
1962). Members of the committee are: Senators Charles C. Moore (Chair-
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Bell, Clyde A. Eltzroth, and Paul M. Moore; Judicial Council appointees,
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tion of the need for uniformity of law in the several states
was the creation of the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, whose first major project was the
promulgation of the Negotiable Instruments Law in 1896.
Thereafter the conference commissioned the drafting of the
Uniform Sales Act (1906), Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act
(1906), Uniform Stock Transfer Act (1909), Uniform Con-
ditional Sales Act (1918), and the Uniform Trust Receipts
Act (1933).
In 1940, when the conference met to consider amendments
to the Uniform Sales Act in order to avoid conflict with a
proposed Federal Sales Act, a proposal was made to abandon
the piecemeal approach to codification of commercial law in
favor of a single comprehensive statute. The suggestion was
accepted and the Uniform Commercial Code was conceived.
2
In 1942 the American Law Institute and the conference
joined in this undertaking and appointed an editorial board
and numerous drafting committees composed of many na-
tionally prominent judges, lawyers, and law teachers. The
Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the
American Bar Association worked with the editorial board
and made numerous suggestions, many of which were in-
corporated into the code. In 1951 the official text was ap-
proved by the two sponsoring organizations and by the House
of Delegates of the American Bar Association.3
This text, with the drafter's official comments as finally
approved, was available in 1952 and the next year the code
was enacted in Pennsylvania and became effective on July
1, 1954.- The New York Legislature, however, referred it to
the New York Law Revision Commission for a comprehensive
study and public hearings. After three years of work and the
expenditure of over $300,000, the New York commission re-
ported that the Uniform Commercial Code was not satisfac-
tory in its present form.5 In order to meet a number of the
objections raised in this critical analysis the editorial board
revised a number of sections. This became the 1957 and
2. HANDBOOK Or THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS 58 (1940).
3. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS 126, 148 (1953); 76 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 135 (1951).
4. PA.STAT. ANN. tit. 12A (1954).
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finally the 1958 official draft, which has been enacted in
twenty-six states as of the date of this writing.6
In an attempt to head off the tendency to amend parts of
the code as it comes up for enactment in each state and to
iron out defects as they appear in application, a permanent
editorial board was established to consider "uniform" amend-
-ments. This board has published its 1962 official recommen-
dations which will be considered as the most current edition
of the proposed code.7
The basic premise on which the Uniform Commercial Code
is based is that a "commercial transaction" is a single subject
of the law, notwithstanding its many facets, involving the
sale of and payment for goods. There may be a contract for
sale, the giving of a check for part of the purchase price which
may be negotiated through the banking system for collection,
and the acceptance of some form of security for the balance.
The goods may be shipped or stored requiring some form of
document of title.
The basic objective of the code is to bring all of these phases
under one statute and to simplify, clarify, modernize and
make uniform this law.8 The physical arrangement is to treat
these various phases under eight separate articles. These
consist of an article on sales, an article on "commercial
paper" which would repeal the Negotiable Instruments Law,0
an article on bank deposits and collections which would repeal
the Bank Collection Code,10 an article on letters of credit, an
article on bulk sales which would repeal the Bulk Sales Act,"
an article on documents of title which would repeal the Uni-
form Warehouse Receipts Act' 2 and the Uniform Bill of Lad-
ing Act,' 3 an article on investment securities which would
repeal the Uniform Stock Transfer Act,' 4 and finally, an
6. See 1 UNIFORM LAWS ANN., Uniform Commercial Code, Table 1,
xxxiii, for statutory citations. The code is presently pending before the
legislatures of ten additional states.
7. PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COlMlERCIAL CODE,
IRep. No. 1 (1962).
8. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §1-102. Footnote citations to the Uni-
form Commercial Code refer to the 1958 official draft as amended by the
1962 report of the Permanent Editorial Board and will hereafter be cited
as "U.C.C."
9. S.C. CODE §§8-801 to 8-1108 (1962).
10. S.C. CODE §§8-181 to 8-215 (1962).
11. S.C. CODE §§11-201 to 11-206 (1962).
12. S.C. CODE §§69-151 to 69-246 (1962).
13. S.C. CODE §§58-1701 to 58-1777 (1962).
14. S.C. CODE §§12-301 to 12-324 (1962).
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article on all types of personal property security transactions
which would repeal a number of South Carolina statutes deal-
ing with chattel mortgages and related matters.' 5 Article 1
is a general introductory article and article 10 states the
effective date of the code and lists the existing statutes to be
repealed. Other uniform commercial acts which the code re-
places but which have not been enacted in South Carolina are
the Uniform Sales Act, the Uniform Conditional Sales Act,
the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, the Uniform Written Obliga-
tions Act, and the Uniform Fiduciaries Act.
The several predecessor statutes promulgated by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
were all drafted at different times by different hands. For
the first time the code affords the opportunity of integrated
coverage whereby the rules are written with regard to
the inter-relation between the many aspects of a commercial
transaction.
ARTICLE 1: GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 1 contains several general policy pronouncements as
a guide to the construction of sections throughout the code.
Consistent with a major objective of flexibility to permit
adaptability to change and expansion of commercial practice
through custom, usage, and agreement of the parties, section
1-102 expresses a non-controversial preference for freedom
of contract. This general language is at once compromised by
policy considerations which preclude enforcement of such con-
tract terms which would relieve a party of the obligation of
good faith, due care, and such other specific exceptions which
will come as no surprise to the lawyer. 16 For example, the
invalidity of a clause in a security contract depriving the
debtor of certain rights in the collateral upon default is
continued.1
7
Another broad policy statement is the preference for liberal
administration of remedies.'3 This is, no doubt, a reaction
against the tendency of restricting damage for breach found in
15. E.g., S.C. CODE §§45-151 to 45-164 (provisions affecting chattel
mortgages); §§45-201 to 45-211 (assignments of accounts receivable);
§§45-401 to 45-410 (factors' liens on merchandise); §§60-301 to 60-310
(perfection of chattel mortgages) (1962).
16. U.C.G. §1-102 (3).




South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol15/iss3/3
1963] PROPOSED UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 627
some of the case decisions and is more specifically illustrated
in the code by section 2-708, which permits a seller to include
lost profits as part of his damages against a breaching party.
While the code is in effect in some states and not in others,
difficult conflict of laws problems may arise in interstate
commercial transactions. This problem may be partially re-
lieved by the provisions of section 1-105 which authorizes
the parties to the transaction to designate in their contract
the application of law of a state having some reasonable re-
lation to the contract. In the absence of such agreement,
"this act applies to transactions bearing a reasonable relation
to this state." A subsection provides an index to other sections
of the code which specifies the applicable law governing a
specific type of commercial transaction.
Section 1-201 contains a definition of forty-six terms which
are used throughout the code. Some of these are in familiar
usage in the commercial field; others are new or are defined
in a revised or modified way.
ARTICLE 2: SALES
Article 2 is designed to replace the Uniform Sales Act
modifying many of the provisions to meet modern commercial
needs and to fill gaps of coverage which could not have been
anticipated when that Uniform Act was drafted in 1906.
While South Carolina is one of about a dozen states which
has never enacted the Uniform Sales Act, it was essentially
a codification of the common law and thus most of the pro-
visions have been established or have been followed in South
Carolina by the case decisions.
A novelty of the sales article of the code is the attempt to
stratify sales law by stating different rules where the parties
to a sale are merchants. This is more apparent than real,
however, since the term "merchant" is defined as "a person
who deals in goods of the kind"'19 which would include the
great bulk of all sales transactions. (Early drafts of this
article contained some complex and interesting distinctions
between sales to dealers who buy for re-sale, industrial pur-
chasers who buy for use, and sales to individual consumers.
20
19. U.C.C. §2-104.
20. Uniform Commercial Code, Text and Comments Official Edition
(Proposed Final Draft 1950).
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These distinctions have been deleted by subsequent drafts
of the code.)
Title-Passing Concept
A much more significant novelty of article 2 is the attempt
to state the law without reference to what has been considered
the central point in Anglo-American Sales Law for at least a
century and a half - the location of title. Many of the con-
troversies between buyer and seller have been answered by
early common law decisions and subsequently, as codified in
many states by the Uniform Sales Act, by a determination of
the location of title to the goods which formed the subject
matter of the sales transaction.2 1 It has been fictitiously
supposed that the parties intended title to pass at some par-
ticular time.22 To compound the fiction, presumptions as to
when the parties intended the title to pass were invented
which now seem to approach the status of substantive rules
of law.23 Having thus located title in either buyer or seller,
it appears to be a simple and certain matter to proceed from
that point to the result of such important questions as risk
of loss, the right of the seller to maintain an action for the
price (as distinguished from an action for damages), the
buyer's right to have the goods, as well as matters not directly
involved with sales law, such as the tax burden upon the
goods and the right of creditors (including a trustee in bank-
ruptcy) of the buyer or seller to reach the goods.
The drafters of article 2 took the position that this "lump
concept thinking" has created many uncertain and unfair
results, since it is frequently difficult to predict when title
passes, and even when established, it may have no logical
relationship to the rights and duties in question. The basic
approach of "narrow - issue" thinking under the code is gen-
erally stated in section 2-401: "Each provision of this article
with regard to the rights, obligations and remedies of the
seller, the buyer, purchasers or other third parties applies
irrespective of title to the goods except where the provisions
refer to such title." Having thus de-emphasized title, specific
rules are stated to provide solutions to specific problems. Thus,
on the recurring risk of loss problem, possession of the goods
21. UNIFORm SALES AcT §22 (risk of loss); §63 (seller's action for
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is the controlling factor which replaces the title-passing test,24
except where either party is in breach, in which case the loss
falls on the breaching party.25 Where the goods are to be
shipped from seller to buyer, possession, and thus risk of
loss, passes to the buyer when the goods are delivered to the
carrier, except that on a destination contract (e.g., "F.O.B.,
Columbia, South Carolina," where goods are to be shipped
to a buyer in Columbia), possession and risk of loss passes
to the buyer when the goods are tendered at their destination.
26
Furthermore, the seller's rights upon breach by the buyer
to recover the contract price (the seller's remedy which is the
equivalent of the buyer's action for specific performance)
would not turn on the passage of title under the code but on
the more functional basis of whether the seller may be able
to re-sell the goods.
27
Where there are no specific provisions dealing with an
issue, and title-passing remains relevant, such as in deter-
mining the tax incident, or application of other public regula-
tion, section 2-401 prescribes the point in time when title
passes. Generally, this is when the seller completes his per-
formance by delivery of documents of title or of the goods,
when so required; otherwise at the time of contracting., But
in no event will title pass until the goods are identified to
the contract, i.e., with respect to future goods, when they
are designated by the seller as goods to which the contract
refers.
Performance
While the code would seem to continue the -standard for
a seller's performance of "perfect tender," as distinguished
from "substantial performance" where delivery is to be made
in single lot (section 2-601 says "if the goods fail in any
respect to conofrm.. ."), some of the sting has been removed
by the rule of section 2-508 which introduces the concept of
"cure." A seller is permitted to remedy a defective tender
if he can do so within the time set for performance. Further-
more, the seller may cure after the time for performance has
passed if the "buyer rejects a non-conforming tender which
the seller had reasonable grounds to believe would be ac-
24. U.C.C. §2-509.
25. U.C.C. §2-510...
26. U.C.C. §§2-319, 2-509.
27. U.C.C. §2-709.
7
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cepted." This latter provision is designed to relieve the seller
from the "forced breach" advantage enjoyed by the buyer
who could wait until the eleventh hour and reject the goods
(usually for the real reason that due to a change in market
conditions the contract is no longer attractive to him) because
of some minor defect.
Section 2-605 shores up another advantage enjoyed by the
buyer by requiring him to state the grounds for rejection
where a defect in the tender could have been ascertained by
reasonable inspection and could have been cured by the seller
if stated seasonably. Failure on the part of the buyer to
particularize his objection will preclude him from relying
on the unstated defect to justify his rejection. With respect
to other grounds of rejection (those not readily apparent or
not so minor as to be cured) the merchant buyer, upon re-
quest from a merchant seller, must make a written final
statement of all the defects on which he proposes to rely.
Thereafter the buyer is limited to the objections so stated.
Remedies for Breach
Most of the remedy rules upon breach are continued but
with some modifications. The code introduces the concept of
"cover" where the seller fails to perform by giving the buyer
an alternative right to purchase substitute goods and recover
from the seller the difference between the contract price and
the cost of cover as an absolute measure of damages, pro-
vided he purchases in a reasonable manner.28 In order to be
consistent with the right to cover, the buyer's alternative
right to sue for damages is measured by the difference be-
tween the contract price and the market price at the time he
learned of the breach (the time when he could have made a
cover purchase), and not the market price at the time when
the goods should have been delivered.29 The buyer's right
to specific performance is liberalized by section 2-716, when
the goods are "unique (the usual rule) or in other proper
circumstances." This last phrase is apparently to permit the
buyer to have the specific goods when, for example, in an
"output" or "requirements" contract, he is unable to cover,





South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol15/iss3/3
1963] PROPOSED UNIFORM COMMERCI-L CODE 631
As in the case of the buyer's remedies, the seller's rights
under the code upon breach are also similar to existing law
but with some liberalizing modifications. The seller has the
absolute right to re-sell the goods wrongfully refused by the
buyer and recover the difference in re-sale price and the con-
tract price, provided the re-sale is "commercially reason-
able." 0 Section 2-709 expressly permits the seller to recover
any loss of profits which he would have received had the
buyer performed and which the case law has been reluctant
to allow where the market price and contract price are the
same.3
1
Public policy restrictions are imposed on freedom of con-
tract under section 2-718 where a liquidated damage clause
upon breach is enforceable only where reasonable (not ex-
cessive) and in no event will the buyer be made to forfeit
an amount in excess of twenty per cent of the price, or
$500.00, whichever is smaller. An interesting balance between
freedom of contract and policy limitations thereto is found
in section 2-725, which prescribes a four-year statute of limi-
tations for actions on a sales contract which by agreement
may be reduced to not less than one year but may not be
extended.
Formation of the Sales Contract
One area of sales law which is not touched by the Uniform
Sales Act nor treated separately from the general common
law of contracts is the formation of a sales contract. The
application of the usual rules of offer, acceptance and con-
sideration has resulted in some uncommercial and unexpected
results - at least results which are not expected by the non-
lawyer businessman. The drafters of the code took this op-
portunity to make sales contract law conform to commercial
practice and understanding as to when merchants are bound
by their agreements. For example, a written firm offer to
buy or to sell goods may not be revoked for a limited time, even
though no consideration has passed. 32 An offer to buy goods
may be accepted and a contract formed, even though the
acceptance contains some additional or minor different terms,
and such additional terms will become part of the contract
30. U.C.C. §2-706.
31. See generally, Lost Profits as Contract Damages: Problems of
Proof and Limitations on Recovery, 65 YALE L. J. 992 (1956).
32. U.C.C. §2-205.
9
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unless objected to within a reasonable time. 33 Section 2-209
permits a good faith modification of an existing sales contract.
without additional consideration as between merchants. In
authorizing the commercially expedient open-price agreements.
and output and requirement contracts, sections 2-305 and
2-306 deliver the final death blow to the common law objec-
tions of uncertainty and lack of mutuality.
Section 2-201 continues the application of the Statute of
Frauds to sales contracts with some apparent reluctance, as
evidenced by some liberalizing modifications. The amount of
the purchase price, which creates the requirements of a writ-
ing, is increased to $500.00.3" The language "some writing
sufficient to indicate that a contract of sale has been made,
... 1P rejects the strict early case law requirement of stating-
all material terms of the contract in a written memorandum.
Where merchants make an oral telephone contract and a con-
firmation of the conversation is sent by letter, the other party-
must object to the contents of the writing within ten days.
Thereafter, the contract may be proved by oral evidence and
is not subject to the Statute of Frauds defense. Partial per-
formance of an oral contract satisfies the Statute of Frauds
only to the extent that goods or payment have been actually-
received.3.5
Warranties
In dealing with the frequently litigated problem of sales!.
warranties, the code makes surprisingly few changes. One
minor conflict is resolved by the provision of section 2-314
that the "serving for value of food or drink to be consumed'
either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale." Disclaimer
of warranties is still permitted as a matter of freedom of-
contract, but with the condition that if such disclaimer is in a
written contract it must be "conspicuous." Furthermore, to
disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability, the writing-
must mention the word "merchantability."36 The code is..
silent on the question of privity between the seller and buyer
as a pre-requisite of a breach of warranty claim. This highly'
controversial issue is therefore left to the developing case.
33. U.C.C. §2-207.
34. S.C. CODe §11-103 (1962) requires a writing for the sale of goods.
for a price of $50.00 or more.:
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law when a buyer seeks to hold the manufacturer of the
goods liable for defects which constitute a breach of the
"contractual" warranty obligation.
Rights of Third Parties
An important change with respect to the rights of third
parties is the rule of section 2-403 which gives to a buyer
from a merchant who deals in goods of that kind a claim
to the goods which is superior to that of an owner who had
entrusted them with the merchant. Most of the case law, as
well as the Uniform Sales Act, has recognized that an owner
of goods may be estopped under varying circumstances from
asserting his claim of ownership against a bona fide purchaser
from the entruster.3 7 The code rule would further repudiate
the concept that such a transferror can pass no better title
than he has, in favor of the policy of greater negotiability
of goods and protection to a bona fide purchaser. The law,
as it is said to be, would be substantially changed by this
code section. The change appears to be more modest, however,
when compared with the law as it actually is, which tends
to protect the purchaser by working an estoppel against the
entrusting-owner. When goods are sold and the seller remains
in possession, case decisions have held under varying circum-
stances that the seller's creditors may treat the sale as fraudu-
lent and thus void as to them.38 Section 2-402 modifies this
rule by stating that "retention of possession in good faith and
current course of trade by a merchant-seller for a com-
mercially reasonable time after a sale or indentification is
not fraudulent."
37. See, e.g., Budget Plan, Inc. v. Savoy, 336 Mass. 322, 145 N.E.2d
710 (1957), where a bona fide purchaser of a car from a garage prevailed
over the owner who had entrusted it with the garage. The court found
that the conduct of the owner in creating indicia of title in the transferor
precluded the owner from denying the seller's authority to sell under sec-
tion 23 of the Uniform Sales Act. The South Carolina Supreme Court
has recently reached a similar result by estopping a wholesale dealer
from converting title to an automobile as against a buyer from a retail
dealer who was permitted to have possession. Clanton's Auto Auction
Sales, Inc. v. Young, 239 S.C. 250, 122 S.E.2d 640 (1962). See also,
Clanton's Auto Auction Sales, Inc. v. Harvin, 238 S.C. 352, 120 S.E.2d 23T
(1961), and Ex Parte Dort, 238 S.C. 506, 121 S.E.2d 1 (1961).
38. Early South Carolina case law was to the effect that the sale was
conclusively fraudulent as to creditors. Kennedy v. Bass, 2 Mill 125 (S.C.
1818). Later decisions have held that retention of possession gives rise
to a presumption of fraud which may be rebutted by proof of good faith.
E.g., Pregnall v. Miller, 21 S.C. 385 (1884).
11
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ARTICLE 3: COMMERCIAL PAPER
The Uniform Negotiable Instrument Law (NIL) was the
first of the uniform laws promulgated by the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and sub-
sequently enacted by all of the states.39 In repealing the NIL,
article 3 of the code represents the first real re-examination
and revision of the law of commercial paper in over sixty
years. The code drafters apparently found most of the NIL
rules as they applied to commercial paper (the code term
for bills and notes) adequate, since they confined themselves
principally to the tidying up of loose ends by resolving a
number of conflicts which have developed over the years.
An important change in the scope of coverage is to divorce
commercial paper from long-term investment securities by
dealing with the latter in a separate article 8. This would
solve the problem of fitting corporate bonds, which necessarily
carried collateral provisions, into the rigid mold of the NIL
which conceived of all negotiable paper as a "courier without
luggage."
Also, the check collection process by banks which has been
partially dealt with under the Bank Collection Code and the
NIL, is split off and placed under a separate article 4.
Form and Negotiation
The code continues the basic policy that commercial paper,
in order to serve its function as a substitute for money, must
be a certain promise to pay a definite amount of money at a
definite time. A number of conflicting and uncertain rules
of case law, which have attempted to balance this policy with
contemporary commercial needs, are resolved and settled. For
example, negotiability is not affected by any acceleration
clause in a time instrument,40 but such acceleration may be
called only upon the good faith belief that the prospect of
payment is impaired.41 Furthermore, a promise to pay is un-
39. Enacted in South Carolina in 1914 and presently appearing as
S.C. CODE §§8-801 to 8-1076 (1962). For subsequently enacted provisions
relating to negotiable instruments, see S.C. CODE §§8-1081 to 8-1083
(1962).
40. U.C.C. §3-109(1)(c). This would reverse the rule of the leading
South Carolina case of Carroll County Say. Bank v. Strother, 28 S.C. 504,
6 S.E. 313 (1888), which held that where the holder may declare the note
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conditional, and thus negotiability is not impaired, where a
note is executed by a partnership and the promise to pay is
only out of partnership assets, or by a governmental agency
where the promise is limited to payment out of a particular
fund.
42
Most of the basic rules concerning negotiation are contin-
ued under the code. An illustration of a minor change is the
complete rejection of the "once bearer, always bearer" com-
mon law clich6 as partially enacted by section 40 of the NIL,
which treats a bearer instrument as remaining bearer even
though specially indorsed. 43 Section 3-204 of the code permits
any holder, as the owner of commercial paper, to convert
bearer paper to order by special indorsement and thus to
control the method of future negotiation until it is re-converted
to bearer paper by a subsequent holder's blank indorsement.
Section 3-205 includes a conditional indorsement within the
definition of restrictive indorsements. A restrictive indorse-
ment (such as the familiar indorsement for collection) does
not affect an intermediary bank's taking a check in the collec-
tion process, and a restrictive indorsee may be a holder in due
course, to the extent that value is applied by him consistent
with the indorsement.
Liability of Parties
The construction of several NIL sections by the courts has
led to the imposition of liability on parties which the drafters
of the code found to be undesirable. This will be illustrated
by the following examples of changes which the code would
make.
The test of whether a check is bearer or order under NIL
section 9 turns on whether the drawer intends for the named
payee to receive payment; if he does, it is order paper and
thus may be transferred and properly paid only by a valid
indorsement of the payee.44 This conceptual rationale some-
times leads to the result that where a drawer draws a check
with the name of a payee supplied by a dishonest employee,
who then indorses in that name and receives payment, the
paying drawee bank may not debit the account of the drawer,
42. U.C.C. §3-105(1) (g) and (h).
43. S.C. CODE §8-861 (1962).
44. S.C. CODE §8-820(3) (1962), recently applied in Southern Frozen
Foods, Inc. v. Hill and Schumpert, 129 S.E.2d 420 (S.C. 1963).
13
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since it paid an order instrument under a forged indorse-
ment.45 The same result may be reached where an impostor
induces the drawer to make a check payable to the person
impersonated, in which case the check may be an order instru-
ment, since the drawer intends for the named payee to receive
payment.40 Section 3-405 is aimed at this result, not on the
bearer-order theory, but on the basis of allocation of loss, by
the provision that the indorsement under the illustrated cir-
cumstances is effective. Thus the loss is borne by the drawer
and not by the paying drawee.
Section 3-417 contains some elaborate implied warranty
provisions in favor of a drawee given by a holder on pre-
sentment for acceptance or payment, while under the existing
NIL sections 65 and 66 warranties run only to the holder
upon transfer.47 Implied warranties include a warranty of
all necessary indorsements and a warranty that the instru-
ment has not been altered. These warranties are also made
by prior indorsers so that the drawee or acceptor, who is
entitled to recover after payment because of a forgery or
alteration, is not restricted to proceeding only against the
party receiving payment.
Any existing doubt as to the application of the doctrine of
Price v. Neal,48 which places the loss on the drawee bank who
pays or accepts a forged check in favor of a holder in due
course, is clearly removed by the absence of a warranty of
genuineness of the drawer's signature. Section 3-418 con-
firms this result by making payment or acceptance final as
to a holder in due course.
49
45. E.g. Commonwealth v. Farmers Depositors Bank, 264 Ky. 839, 95
S.W.2d 793 (1936). In Bourne v. Maryland Cas. Co., 185 S.C. 1, 192
S.E. 605 (1937), a faithless employee with authority to sign for his em-
ployer, made checks payable to other employees, forged their indorsement
and received payment from the drawee. The court held this to be bearer
paper under S.C. CODE §8-820(3) (1962), since the named payees were
not intended by the drawer-fraudulent-employee to receive the payment.
Applied in Ellis Weaving Mills v. Citizens & So. Nat'l Bank, 91 F. Supp.
943; aff'd, 184 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1950).
46. E.g., Milner v. First Natl Bank, 38 Ga. App. 668, 145 S.E. 101
(1928).
47. S.C. CODE §§8-896 and 8-897 (1962).
48. 3 Burr 1354 (1762).
49. The application of the Price v. Neal rule in South Carolina has
been uncertain in light of the pre-N.I.L. cases of Ford v. Peoples Bank,
74 S.C. 180, 54 S.E. 204 (1906), and Newberry Say. Bank v. Bank of
Columbia, 91 S.C. 294, 74 S.E. 615 (1912), which indicate that a payor
may recover the amount paid on a forged check. Subsequently, S.C.
CODE §8-893 (1962) enacted the rule of Price v. Neal with respect to an
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NIL section 15 provides that nondelivery of an incompleted
instrument is a real defense available against even a holder
in due course, although neither nondelivery nor unauthorized
completion of a delivered instrument may be asserted against
a holder in due course. This is the case of the careless drawer
who signs checks but does not fill in all blanks, which checks
are stolen, filled in, and negotiated to a holder in due course.
Section 3-115 reverses this result by treating this as only
a personal defense "when a paper whose contents at the time
of signing show that it is intended to become an instru-
ment ...
The requirement of timely presentment to parties who are
primarily liable (drawees, makers and acceptors) and notice
of dishonor in order to hold parties who are secondarily liable
(indorsers and drawers) is continued under the code.50 The
requirement of formal protest, however, is practically elimi-
nated as a condition to holding secondary parties liable, by
limiting this requirement to a draft drawn in a foreign coun-
try upon a drawee located in the United States.51 The time
within which a check must be presented for payment is
lengthened to thirty days with respect to the liability of a
drawer and to seven days after indorsement with respect
to the liability of an indorser, as a matter of presumed rea-
sonable time.52 The NIL rule of complete discharge of an
indorser by a delay in presentment or notice of dishonor is
preserved under the code,53 The discharge to a drawer only to
the extent of prejudice by such delay (usually by insolvency
of the drawee during the period of delay) applies to all
drawers. 54 This pro tanto discharge of drawers does not
apply under NIL section 70 to the drawer of a bill of exchange
other than a check who is fully discharged. Nor does it apply
to makers of a note payable "at a bank," or acceptors of a
bill where the acceptance is payable "at a bank," who are
not discharged at all.r 5
50. S.C. CODE §8-931 (1962), applied in Bass v. Rainwater, 133 S.C.
315, 131 S.E. 41 (1925).
51. U.C.C. §3-501(3). Cf. S.C. CODE §§8-1021, 8-984 (1962).
52. U.C.C. §3-503 (2) Cf. S.C. CODE §8-804 (1962).
53. U.C.C. §3-501(1) (b) and (2) (a). S.C. CODE §8-911 (1962).
54. U.C.C. §3-501(1) (c) and (2) (b). Cf. S.C. CODE §§8-911 and 8-1073
(1962).
55. S.C. CODE §8-911 (1962).
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Discharge
The grounds for discharge under the code are similar to the
NIL, except that section 3-601 of the code makes it clear that
discharge applies only to the parties to the instrument (and
not to the instrument itself) in order to remove the implica-
tion that an act which constitutes a discharge may create a
defense to a holder in due course. One substantial change
relates to discharge by payment which, under NIL section
119, requires payment "in due course.""0 NIL section 88
defines this as payment "without notice that his title was de-
fective," even though the payor had no way of knowing
whether the assertion of an adverse claim is valid.57 Code
section 3-603 changes this by permitting discharge by payment
to the holder, in spite of knowledge of an adverse claim (thus
preserving the payor's credit standing) unless the adverse
claimant supplies indemnity. This is further qualified by
not including payment to a thief or payment in a manner
inconsistent with a restrictive indorsement.
ARTICLE 4: BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS
Attempts at codification of the law governing the bank
collection process have had a turbulent past. The National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws made
an effort to draft a uniform act, but it met with such opposi-
tion from bankers that it was never enacted into law in any
jurisdiction. A Bank Collection Code was drafted under the
auspices of the American Bankers' Association, and it there-
fore cannot be called a "Uniform Act" in the usual sense.
This "ABA Code" was passed in a number of states shortly
after it was drafted, including South Carolina, which enacted
it in 1930.1S The enthusiasm for this legislation was slowed
down by criticism that it was unfairly weighed in favor of
banks and against their depositors, that it was poorly
drafted,"0 and finally by the 1935 decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Jennings v. United States Fid.
& Guar. Co.,00 that one section was invalid as it applied
to national banks.
56. S.C. CODE §8-971 (1962).
57. S.C. CODE §8-929 (1962).
58. S.C. CODE §§8-181 to 8-215 (1962).
59. E.g., TowNSEND, The Bank Collection Code of the American
Bankers' Association, (Pts. 1-3) 8 Tim. L. REv. 21, 236, 376 (1933-1934).
60. 294 U.S. 216, 79 L.Ed 865 (1935).
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After considerable vacillation, including an initial plan to
include the bank collection material under article 3, and a
decision, after the traditional cross-fire of controvery sur-
rounding this subject, to drop the subject from the code al-
together, the drafters of the code finally decided to include
a separate article 4. This decision was based on the need for
uniform rules to govern the great volume of checks which
continuously flow across state lines in the bank collection
process. The scope of this article encompasses practically
every item, broadly defined as any instrument for the payment
of money which passes through banks for the purpose of pre-
sentment, payment or collection. 61
Final Payment of Checks
One of the most important problems in the bank collection
process is the establishment of a precise time when a check
is deemed to have been finally paid by the drawee bank. It
is at that point that it is no longer possible for the drawer
to stop payment, the drawer's account is charged with the
amount of the check (so that his creditors may not thereafter
attach these funds on deposit), the provisional credit to the
account of the depositor of the check becomes irrevocable
so that he may draw against that credit, drawers and in-
dorsers of the check are discharged, and the point of no
return is reached so that the payor bank is accountable for
the amount of the check. Code section 4-213 continues the
obvious rule that the final payment occurs when the payor
bank pays cash to the holder over the counter. This section
further fixes definite rules for time of payment in the more
usual case when a check comes to the payor from a depository
bank - either directly or through an intermediary bank or
through a clearing house in the collection process. The usual
practice in such case is for the payor bank to give provisional
credit for the item at the time of receipt, reserving the right
to revoke that credit if it subsequently decides that the check
should not be paid. Since time is of the essence, the payor
bank will be deemed to have finally paid if it takes no action
to revoke the provisional credit within the period prescribed
by clearing house rules (in some instances a matter of hours
after receipt). When a check is sent through the mails to
the payor bank, the code requires a revocation of the pro-
61. U.C.C. §4-104(2).
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visional credit within the "midnight deadline." 62 This term
is defined in section 4-104 as "midnight on the next banking
day following the banking day on which it receives the item
"Midnight deadline" is also the presumed period of
time within which a collecting or intermediary bank receiving
a check in the collection process must act in presenting for
payment, sending notice of dishonor, etc. 3 For the purpose
of computing the commencement of the period, existing bank-
ing practice of fixing an afternoon hour no earlier than 2
p.m. as a cut-off time after which items will be considered
as received on the next banking day, is recognized by code
section 4-107.
An alternative point of final payment after which a check
may not be returned, is the "posting" of the check by the
payor, i.e., the mechanical act of debiting the drawer's account.
The point of time after which a stop-payment order from the
drawer or attachment of the account by the drawer's creditors
is not effective is established as the time of "sight posting."64
In the collection process this occurs when a clerk has placed
the check in a stack to be sent to another office for final post-
ing and is based on the practical difficulty of preventing the
payment by final posting after this time.
Relationship Between Payor Bank and Its Customer
Article 4 contains a number of rules governing the rela-
tionship between a payor bank and its customers, some of
which would modify or directly change existing law or settle
areas of present uncertainty. Section 4-402 recognizes the
generally understood rule that a drawee bank has a duty to
pay a check which is a proper order to pay,65 but modifies the
damage rule for breach of this duty by limiting recovery to
actual damages proved. 66 When two or more checks are pre-
sented for payment at the same time and the account is in-
sufficient to pay them all, the bank may pay in any order with
impunity until the deposit is no longer sufficient to pay any
62. U.C.C. §4-301. Cf. S.C. CODE §8-211 (1962).
63. U.C.C. §4-202(2).
64. U.C.C. §4-303(1) (d).
65. St. Charles Mercantile Co. v. Armour & Co., 156 S.C. 397, 153
S.E. 473 (1930).
66. Present case law in South Carolina permits recovery of substantial
damages without proof of special damages where a drawee bank negli-
gently fails to honor a check. E.g., Johnson v. National Bank, 213 S.C.
458, 50 S.E.2d 177 (1948).
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one.67 Present uncertainty as to the effectiveness of stop-
payment orders is removed by section 4-403, which makes an
oral order binding upon the bank for fourteen days and a
written order effective for six months.6 8 A bank's duty to
its depositor with respect to a stale check presented for pay-
ment is clarified by section 4-404, which provides that the
bank may, but need not, pay a check which is presented more
than six months after its date.69 When the drawer of a check
dies or is incompetent before it is paid, the order to pay is
still effective until the bank learns of the death or incom-
petence and may pay for ten days after such knowledge.
70
Code section 4-406 continues the common law duty of a
depositor to examine his bank statements and paid items and
notify the bank with reasonable promptness of a forgery of his
signature on a check that has been paid or any alteration, at
pain of being precluded from asserting such irregularities.7 1
This section gives the drawer 14 days after the return of an
item and statement to discover and notify the bank of a
forgery or alteration. Thereafter he is estopped to assert any
subsequent forgery or alteration by the same wrongdoer. In
all other cases, without regard to negligence, the customer
has one year from the time the statement and items are made
available to him to discover and report to the bank a forgery
of his signature or an alteration and three years from such
time to report a forged indorsement.
ARTICLE 5: LETTERS OF CREDIT
The commercial letter of credit has been employed princi-
pally in international trade where the foreign seller is willing
to ship goods only on the credit of a known bank which
promises to pay the purchase price upon the receipt of the bill
of lading and other necessary documents. Prior to the code,
the law concerning letters of credit came from common law
decisions, principally of New York, Massachusetts and Cali-
fornia, where the bulk of foreign commerce is financed. Thus,
article 5 of the code breaks new ground in codifying the legal
rules concerning this device. The greater certainty and clari-
67. U.C.C. §4-303(2).
68. Cf. S.C. CODE §§8-1082, 8-1083 (1962).
69. Cf. S.C. CODE §8-1081 (1962).
70. U.C.C. §4-405. See S.C. CODE §11-302 (1962) as to a note or bill
negotiated by an agent after the death of the drawer or indorser.
71. Hair v. Winnsboro Bank, 103 S.C. 543, 88 S.E. 26 (1915).
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fication afforded by statutory treatment, may increase its use
in domestic trade where a distant seller may have the added
protection of substituting the credit of a bank for that of a
buyer, who may have already arranged for financing of the
purchase price by the bank. The customary documentary sale,
whereby the seller sends the bill of lading with a draft drawn
on the buyer to a bank in the buyer's town for collection,
unlike the letter of credit, does not shift the risk of non-pay-
ment from the seller to the bank.
In order to serve this essential risk shifting function, the
bank is legally divorced from matters relating to the underly-
ing contract of sale, such as the quantity and quality of the
goods. Thus, under the code, the issuing bank's liability to
pay and its entitlement to reimbursement from its customer
become absolute upon the receipt of the documents called for.7 2
If the bank is notified prior to payment that the documents
are forged or that there is fraud in the transaction between
the buyer and seller, the bank is given an option to honor the
draft or demand for payment, unless the customer has ob-
tained a court injunction against the issuer's exercise of its
option.
Normally, a bank will issue a straight letter of credit where
the language "we engage with you" is used. In such form,
the promise does not run to a purchaser of the draft as a
holder in due course, on the theory that he sees on the face
that the promise runs only to the issuee. A letter of credit
may, however, be made negotiable and may be negotiated to
a holder in due course, who may enforce it against the issuer
regardless of any fraud in the transaction or forgery of the
document.
73
In order to examine the documents and make sure that they
comply with the letter of credit, the bank is given until the
close of the third banking day following receipt of the docu-
ments to honor the draft. Failure to act within this time
constitutes dishonor.
7 4
Upon wrongful dishonor under an irrevocable credit, the
presentor may recover from the issuer the face amount of the
draft, plus incidental damages recoverable by a seller under
72. U.C.C. §5-114.
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article 2, less any amount realized from re-sale or other use
of the subject matter of the transaction.
7 5
ARTICLE 6: BULK TRANSFERS
Article 6 is similar to the South Carolina Bulk Sales Act,76
having the same purpose of protecting creditors of a merchant
by voiding a bulk transfer of merchandise out of the ordinary
course of trade, unless the transferee gives notice to all known
creditors of the contemplated transfer at least ten days be-
fore he takes possession.
Coverage is extended under code section 6-102 to include
sales of business equipment if it is made in connection with a
bulk transfer of inventory.7 7 Also, a bulk sale at auction under
section 6-108 would expand existing coverage, in which case
the auctioneer is charged with the responsibility similar to
that of a transferee of other bulk sales where he knows the
auction constitutes a bulk transfer. Failure to comply does
not affect the rights of the purchasers, but the auctioneeer
is personally liable to the creditors of the transferor for un-
collected debts, but not exceeding the net proceeds of the
auction.
78
ARTICLE 7: DOCUMENTS OF TITLE
Article 7 would repeal and modernize the half-century-old
Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act (UWRA)7 9 and the Uni-
form Bills of Lading Act (UBLA), 80 integrating the statu-
tory treatment of these documents. Some new coverage is
included to cover modern shipping and storage practices,
which were not contemplated by the original uniform acts,
such as bonded storage required by federal or state statute,
air bills and problems which arise under modern high-speed
or truck transportation. Of course, this state legislation would
not affect federal legislation dealing with interstate ship-
75. U.C.C. §5-115.
76. S.C. CODE §§11-201 to 11-206 (1962).
77. Contra, Smith v. Boyer, 119 S.C. 176, 112 S.E. 71 (1921) which
held that trade fixtures are not included under the Bulk Sales Act.
78. U.C.C. §6-108(4).
79. S.C. CODE §§69-151 to 69-246 (1962), enacted in South Carolina
in 1945.
80. S.C. CODE §§58-1701 to 58-1777 (1962), enacted in South Carolina
in 1930.
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ments, such as the Federal Bills of Lading Act or the Federal
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.81
As under the UWRA, a warehouse receipt, by definition,
must be issued by a warehouseman, which does not include a
person who stores his own goods.8 2 An important exception
to this is found in section 7-201, which treats a receipt as a
warehouse receipt governed by this article when issued by
a non-warehouseman under a statute requiring a bond against
withdrawal.
The essential terms of the warehouse receipt are similar to
those under existing law,83 but the code preserves obligations
of the issuer even though the document does not comply with
the formal requirements.84 Essential terms of a bill of lading
provided by the UBLA are omitted from the code,85 but fed-
eral regulation of the forms used in interstate commerce will
continue to control.
An illustration of the code's modernization of documents of
title is the newly authorized "destination bill" designed to
meet the problem of high speed aid transportation where
the goods may arrive at the destination before the documents.
This could be inconvenient where the carrier does not have
storage facilities, and even more serious where the goods
are perishable. To meet this problem, section 7-305 authorizes
the carrier, upon receipt of the goods for shipment, to wire
or cable its agent at the destination point to issue the bill.
(Of course, the carrier may not issue the bill until the
goods are received.) Assuming the usual documentary sale,
the bill would be issued to the buyer's bank, the seller
sale, the bill would be issued to the buyer's bank, the seller
would wire the bank a draft on the buyer, and the bank would
indorse the bill to the buyer when he honors the draft.
Many of the familiar negotiable instruments rules apply
where a document of title is negotiable and is taken by "due
negotiation." A new requirement is that negotiation must be
in the "regular course of business or financing" in order for
the transferee to take free of defenses and claims of owner-
81. U.C.C. §7-103 expressly subjects the provisions of article 7 to
state as well as federal regulatory statutes and to tariffs, classifications,
or regulations thereunder.
82. U.C.C. §7-201; S.C. CODE §69-161 (1962).
83. U.C.C. §7-202; S.C. CODE §69-162 (1962).
84. U.C.C. §7-401.
85. S.C. CODE §58-1711 (1962).
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ship to which his transferor is subject.8 6 To qualify under
this provision, the person making the transfer must be a
person in the trade and the nature of the transaction must be
a usual and ordinary transaction in which documents are
transferred.
A bona fide purchaser of an altered document of title may
enforce it according to its original tenor. The same rule
applies to the filling in of blanks in a bill of lading, 7 but a
bona fide purchaser may treat as authorized the filling of a
blank in a negotiable warehouse receipt.88 This absolute
liability imposed on a warehouseman for the unauthorized
filling of blanks is in recognition of the unnecessary danger
of executing warehouse receipts in blank. It is often necessary
for carriers to execute bills of lading in blank to be filled out
by various employees, and thus the consequence of improper
completion of bills carries no sanction.
ARTICLE 8: INVESTMENT SECURITIES
The principal statutory law in South Carolina today govern-
ing the transfer of certificates of stock as an investment se-
curity is the Uniform Stock Transfer Act.89 As a type of
negotiable instrument, the present Uniform Negotiable Instru-
ments Law is also applicable to bearer bonds. The code would
repeal the Uniform Stock Transfer Act and replace it with
article 8 which also separates the law of investment securities
from the short-term negotiable paper of article 3. Article 8
extends new statutory coverage to registered bonds and other
types of investment paper not presently covered by any uni-
form act. The matter of regulation of securities under the
federal and state "blue sky laws" is not dealt with by this
article.
As the negotiable instruments law of securities, the basic
policies of free transferability and protection to a holder are
similar to those of article 3, but without the formal prerequi-
sites of negotiability required by the Negotiable Instruments
Law and article 3 of the code. Thus a bona fide purchaser of
securities is similar to a holder in due course in negotiable
instrument law, in that he takes free of defenses and adverse
86. U.C.C. §7-501.
87 U.C.C. §7-306. Cf. S.C. CODE §58-1720 (1962).
88. U.C.C. §7-208. Cf. S.C. CODE §69-186 (1962).
89. S.C. CODE §§12-301 to 12-324 (1962).
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claims of ownership. 90 Similar to the rule of forged com-
mercial paper, no holder has a right against an issuer of a
counterfeit security or one on which the validating signature
is unauthorized. 91 Under code section 8-205, however, an
unauthorized signature is valid in favor of a good faith pur-
chaser for value when it is of a person entrusted by the
issuer with signing the security or an employee entrusted
with handling the security. Code section 8-206 follows the
change in the law of commercial paper under article 3 by
protecting a purchaser for value without notice from the
defense of improper completion where blanks are left upon the
issue of a security.
9 2
The purchaser of commercial paper after maturity is auto-
matically subject to all defenses under article 3. His counter-
part as a purchaser of security under section 8-203 will be
deprived of the bona fide purchaser status only where he
purchases more than two years after a call for redemption or
exchange, or one year after such call, if the funds or securities
are available for delivery when due.
Code section 8-104 prescribes a new formula for adjusting
the rights of a holder against the issuer of an over-issue
of securities, as where a stock transfer agent issues the new
certificate without the surrender of a certificate for a cor-
responding number of shares thereby creating an excess of
the issuer's chartered allowance. The code rule resolves this
problem by compelling the issuer to purchase shares on the
market to replace the over-issue. If shares are not available
from the market, the holder may obtain reimbursement at
the price paid or, if not purchased, at the last purchase price.
ARTICLE 9: SECURED TRANSACTIONS
Article 9 is probably the most important article of the code
since its scope reaches transactions whose intended effect is
to create a security interest in personal property. Further-
more, in order to accomplish its fundamental objective of
providing uniform and simplified rules governing chattel se-
curity which meet modern commercial needs, it has been
necessary to introduce a number of new concepts which would
more substantially change existing practice than any other
article of the code.
90. U.C.C. §§8-202 (4), 8-301(2).
91. U.C.C. §8-202(3).
92. See U.C.C. §3-115 (2). Cf. S.C. CODE §8-826 (1962).
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In limiting the area of coverage to chattel financing, article
9 divorces itself from its ancestor, the real property mort-
gage.9 3 Existing state statutory expressions of local public
policy regulating credit (e.g., usury and small loan acts) and
creating liens in favor of preferred creditors (eg., landlords
and materialmen) are unaffected by this article.94 Also, exist-
ing federal legislation dealing with the recording of a security
interest in certain types of collateral, such as airplanes and
ships, and state automobile title laws are made to fit into the
scheme of article 9 without change. 95 The remaining aspects
of secured financing law, including the creation attachment,
and perfection of a security interest, are treated for the first
time in an integrated, comprehensive, and uniform way by this
article.
In treating a security transaction as a single entity in which
there is a conveyance of a security interest in personal prop-
erty to secure the payment of a debt, article 9 rejects any
distinction based on the form or designation of the device em-
ployed, such as chattel mortgage, conditional sales agreement,
trust receipt, etc.9 6 Different results are reached in some in-
stances on functional grounds, depending upon the nature of
the collateral and its use. For this purpose, section 9-109
divides all collateral into four classificiations: consumer goods
used for personal purposes; equipment used principally in
business; farm products in possession of a person engaged in
farming operations; and inventory held by a business enter-
prise for sale, or materials used, consumed, or manufactured.
Consistent with this general functional rather than formal
and conceptual approach, article 9 states substantive rules
without regard to the ancient controversy over whether the
secured party acquires "title" to collateral or a "mere lien.19 7
Creation of the Security Interest
In order to create or convey a security interest which is
valid between the parties, a minimum of formalities is pre-
scribed by the code. The pledge type is recognized and re-
quires nothing more than delivery of the collateral or docu-
93. U.C.C. §9-104(j). But see U.C.C. §9-313 dealing with fixtures.
94. U.C.C. §9-104 (b) (c). But see U.C.C. §9-310 dealing with priority
of statutory liens.
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ments of title which represent the goods pledged.98 For the
creation of the more usual type of non-possessory security
interest, all that is necessary is a simple security agreement
signed by the debtor, containing a general description of the
collateral.90 When there is such an agreement, value is given,
and the debtor has rights in the collateral, the security interest
attaches in favor of the secured party. 00
In a modern industrial economy there is frequently an
urgent need for even the most successful and solvent business
enterprise to acquire working capital in order to finance the
acquisition of inventory and meet current operational ex-
penses. A financier may be willing to supply these funds only
when he can acquire a valid security interest in the commercial
debtor's inventory or equipment which will stand up against
claims of third parties. Since inventory is frequently in a
state of motion in the resale or manufacturing cycle, what is
needed is an effective "floating lien" which automatically
feeds the security agreement as it is acquired by the debtor
and which relates back to the time of its initial execution and
perfection. Where the collateral is business equipment which
may be replaced before the loan is repaid, it is also com-
mercially desirable for the replacements to attach auto-
matically to the security interest.
One of the most significant accomplishments of article 9
is that it meets these needs by expressly validating the "after-
acquired property" clause in a security agreement whereby
a lien on inventory or replacement equipment attaches as.
it is acquired by the debtor.' 0 ' To complete the commercial
objective of a continuing extension of credit secured by new-
inventory or equipment as acquired, section 9-204 expressly
validates the extension of the security interest to future
advances.'
0 2
98. U.C.C. §9-203(1) (a).
99. U.C.C. §9-203 (1) (b).
100. U.C.C. §9-204(1).
101. U.C.C. §9-204(3). For an excellent discussion of the historicaL
development of judicial treatment of this subject see, COHEN AND GERBER,
The Aftcr-Acquired Property Clause, 87 U. PA. L. REV. 635 (1939).
South Carolina case law seems generally to assume that the after-.
acquired property is valid and attaches as soon as the property is ac-
quired by the mortgagor. E.g., Clowney v. Rivers, 129 S.C. 58, 123 S.E.
759 (1924).
102. S.C. CODE §45-55 (1962) also permits future advances to be se-
cured by a mortage previously executed which shall be valid as to third,
parties as of the time of recording.
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The effectiveness of this inventory financing arrangement
to withstand the attack of unsecured creditors directly or
through their representatives, the trustee in bankruptcy, has
been in doubt ever since the 1925 United States Supreme
Court decision of Benedict v. Ratner'0 3 held the transaction
void as a fraud against creditors where the debtor was given
unfettered dominion or control over assigned accounts re-
ceivable and inventory collateral. Code section 9-205 removed
that doubt by rejecting the principal of Benedict v. Ratner
as a matter of state law which should be controlling in fed-
eral bankruptcy litigation since the trustee's attack under the
Benedict case is under section 70 (e) of the Bankruptcy Act,
which gives him the rights of creditors under state law.
10 4
The validation of the "after-acquired-property" clause as
the key to effective commercial financing does not apply to
consumer goods acquired by the debtor more than ten days
after the secured party gives value.10 5 This is in recognition
of the social and economic objection to tying up all of the
future acquisitions of an individual by such a continuing
blanket lien. A similar policy decision is the basis of the limi-
tation on crop financing to crops which become such within
one year after the security agreement is executed. 0 6
Perfection
The code continues to recognize that for most types of col-
lateral the perfection of a security interest against third
parties - the real test of its effectiveness - may be ac-
complished alternatively by pledge or by record notice1 ° 7 The
103. 268 U.S. 353.
104. This has not been a serious obstacle to inventory and accounts
receivable financing in South Carolina since case law has rejected the
majority American view which treats a mortgage as fraudulent per se
where the mortgagor is allowed to sell the collateral in the course of
trade. E.g., Marshall v. Crawford, 45 S.C. 189, 22 S.E. 792 (1895). Thus,
if the mortgagor becomes a bankrupt, the mortgagee's interest is not
subject to attach under section 70(e) of the Federal Bankruptcy Act
by reason of unfettered dominion by the mortgagor. Bank of Dillon v.
Murchison, 213 Fed. 147 (C.C.A. 4th, 1914). With respect to accounts
receivable, S. C. CODE §45-207 (1962) provides: "No permission by the
assignee to the assignor to exercise dominion and control over a pro-
tected assignment or the proceeds thereof shall invalidate the assignment
as to third parties."
105. U.C.C. §9-204 (4) (b).
106. U.C.C. §9-204(4) (a); S.C. CODE; §45-152 (1962) presently limits
a mortgage on crops to those to be planted or grown within five years
from the execution of the mortgage.
107. U.C.C. §§9-203 (1) (a), 9-305, 9-301. A security interest in intan-
gibles (e.g., accounts receivable) may be perfected only by filing. U.C.C.
649
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code adopts what may be generally described as a "lien
creditor-race" approach. Only creditors who have obtained a
lien without knowledge of the security interest and before it
is perfected may defeat the security interest.108 As between
conflicting security interests in the same collateral, priority
is accorded to the first to perfect, regardless of notice, and
regardless of the order of attachment. 00
These generalizations are subject to some important excep-
tions and modifications which need to be outlined in order to
present a clearer and more accurate picture of the code's ap-
proach to perfection. It should be noted that perfection is a
relative term since the security interest may be perfected
as to one class of third parties but not as to another.
In the context of inventory financing, its is the usual under-
standing of the parties that the debtor will sell his inventory
in the ordinary course of business and is usually so authorized.
Code section 9-307 recognizes this commercial understanding
by providing that the buyer out of inventory in the ordinary
course of business takes free of the inventory financer's se-
curity interest, even though he has knowledge of it. The
proceeds received from such sale of inventory are subject to
a continuing security interest in favor of the inventory
financer, if perfected by express coverage in the instrument
filed for record. In the event of insolvency proceedings against
the debtor, the perfected security interest in proceeds which
are comingled with other funds of the debtor is limited to
an amount received within ten days of the institution of such
insolvency proceedings." 0 Thus, the inventory financer who
properly perfects his security interest will be protected against
the honest insolvency of the debtor, to the extent of the value
of the collateral. Despite the code's rejection of the Benedict
Rule, which compelled the security financer to exercise some
control over the inventory collateral, some element of the
policing and accounting doctrine of that case remains in order
to avoid the loss of proceeds received by the debtor more than
ten days prior to insolvency proceedings.
§9-305. A security interest in instruments or negotiable documents is
perfected against creditors for a period of 21 days without filing or the
taking of possession. U.C.C. §9-304 (4).
108. U.C.C. §9-301 (1) (b). Cf. S.C. CODE §60-101 (1962).
109. U.C.C. §9-312(5).110. U.C.C. §9-306.
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Where the secured party does not authorize the sale of the
collateral, as where the collateral is business equipment, or
in the case of crop financing, a purchaser of the collateral
will take subject to the perfected security interest."1'
No filing is necessary in order to perfect a purchase money
security interest in consumer goods and farm equipment hav-
ing a purchase price not in excess of $2,500.112 Purchasers
from the debtor, however, will take free of the unfiled se-
curity interest in such goods.113 This treatment of consumer
goods does not apply to the financing of automobiles for
private use where the state's certificate of title law, eliminat-
ing the requirement of perfection by filing, would govern." 4
For the mechanics of perfecting a non-possessory security
interest in chattel by filing, the code borrows the concept of
"notice filing from the Uniform Trust Receipts Act (enacted
in 33 states but not South Carolina) as an alternative to
filing the security agreement itself." 5 This is record or con-
structive notice by the filing of an abbreviated statement
which need only contain the signature and address of the
debtor and secured party and a general description of the
types or items of the collateral." 6 This "financing statement"
device is designed principally to facilitate the perfection of a
security interest in inventory where there is a continuing
change in the collateral and in the amount of indebtedness.
The record notice is effective for a period of five years from
the time the statement is presented to the filing clerk with
the fee, subject to renewal for a like term by filing a "con-
tinuation statement.""17
Since this non-informative notice filing does not reveal the
amount of the secured debt at any given time, section 9-208
makes provision for the debtor to obtain a statement from the
secured party of record setting out this information, which
111. U.C.C. §9-307.
112. U.C.C. §9-302(1) (c) and (d).
113. U.C.C. §9-307(2).
114. U.C.C. §9-302(3) (b). See S.C. CODE §46-150.41 to 46-150.51 (1962)
for perfection of a security interest in motor vehicles.
115. The notice filing concept was introduced in South Carolina in
1938 by the Factor's Lien Act, S.C. CODE §45-403 (1962) and later ap-
plied to the assignment of accounts receivable by S.C. CODE §45-204
(1962).
116. U.C.C. §9-402.
117. U.C.C. §9-403. Filing of a chattel mortgage in South Carolina is
effective for three years subject to renewal for the same period by re-
filing. S.C. CODE §§60-305 and 60-306 (1962).
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may be then relied on by third parties who deal with the
debtor. Whenever there is no longer an outstanding obliga-
tion, section 9-404 places the burden on a secured party of
record to send a "termination statement" to the filing officer
to remove the financing statement from the record." 8 If the
secured party fails to send such a termination statement
within ten days after demand by the debtor, he is liable for
$100 damages plus any loss caused to the debtor by such
failure.
Where the collateral remains at rest in the possession of
the debtor, the secured party may continue the present prac-
tice of filing the security agreement as a "financing state-
ment" rather than execute the separate abbreviated state-
ment which will usually be limited to inventory financing. In
that event the code eliminates most of the formal and technical
prerequisites to filing such as acknowledgement or witness-
ing."" A new requirement is that the secured party must also
sign the agreement as a prerequisite to effective filing in
order to establish his responsibility for issuing the termina-
tion statement.12 0
Priorities
It has been stated that priority among conflicting security
interests in the same collateral is determined by the order of
perfection. This is true regardless of the order in which the
consideration passes - that is, the time when the secured
loan is made - and regardless of actual knowledge. A most
important application of this rule and the notice filing concept
is the protection it affords to the inventory financer in grant-
ing maximum protection against the honest insolvency of his
debtor. The financer, having determined that the debtor's
property is not subject to a recorded security interest or
creditor's lien, may execute and file the abbreviated financ-
ing statement containing a general description of the col-
lateral to be covered, an after-acquired property clause, and
a claim of proceeds, if appropriate. Thereafter, the security
agreement may be executed and the money advanced, at which
time the security interest in the collateral attaches, but with
the effective date of perfection as of the prior time when
118. Cf. S.C. CODE §§45-61 to 45-67 (1962).
119. Cf. S.C. CODE §60-51 (1962).
120. Note 116, supra.
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the financing statement was filed. Even if a creditor of the
debtor should acquire a lien or advance money and take a
security interest in the same collateral, his interest would be
subordinate to the security interest which was filed first, but
which attached later. Assuming that the collateral is inven-
tory and the secured party has authorized its sale, he may
now look to the proceeds which were expressly claimed in the
filed financing statement and any replacement of inventory
which was covered by the after-acquired property clause, all
of which were perfected as of the time of initial filing. It
is apparent that the drafters of article 9 focused their atten-
tion on this chattel financing situation and set out to accom-
plish this result by giving maximum protection to the diligent
secured party against losses resulting from the honest in-
solvency of the debtor. It is also apparent that the policy
objective designed to lead to this result was to encourage the
supplying of working capital - the vital ingredient of an
expanding industrial economy.
The "first-to-perfect" rule, as the basic formula for de-
termining the order of priorities, is subject to an important
qualification where one of the competing claimants holds a
purchase money security interest to secure the purchase price
of newly acquired goods and the other claims the purchased
collateral under an after-acquired property clause. In the con-
text of equipment financing, if the purchase money financer
perfects his security interest within ten days after the debtor
receives protection in the collateral, he will have a priority
claim in this collateral over the financer claiming under an
after-acquired property clause. 121 This preferred treatment
of the purchase money security interest constitutes an excep-
tion to the usual rule that after-acquired property feeds a
security interest when acquired and is deemed perfected as
of the time of the filing of the financing statement containing
an after-acquired property clause. Where the collateral is
inventory, the purchase money security claimant has priority
over a conflicting security interest only when he perfects
before the debtor receives possession of the collateral (without
benefit of the ten-day grace period for filing) and only if he
gives notice of his claim to the inventory financer who has
previously filed a financing statement claiming the same in-
121. U.C.C. §9-312(4).
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ventory under an after-acquired property clause. 122 The rea-
son for the additional requirement of notice in order for the
purchase money financer of inventory to enjoy a priority
position, is to save the initial general inventory financer from
the risk of continuing to make advances to the debtor under
the belief that the subsequently acquired inventory continues
to feed his security interest.
Several other special modifications of the first-to-perfect-
priority rule should be mentioned. Section 9-312(2) accords
priority to a perfected security interest in crops to secure a
loan given not more than three months before the crops are
planted. Section 9-310 gives priority to statutory liens for
services or materials, unless the statute creating the lien pro-
vides otherwise.
A security interest in personal property which thereafter
becomes a fixture by attachment to real property takes
priority over all prior security claims in the realty.1 23 Simi-
larly, a security interest in goods which are affixed to other
goods (typically a security interest in tires, subsequently in-
stalled on cars) takes priority over prior claims to the
whole.
24
Under section 9-315, a perfected security interest in goods,
which through processing become so comingled as to lose
their identity in the product or mass (e.g., raw materials),
continues in the product or mass. This section also covers
the case where the collateral consists of components assembled
into a machine and which do not lose their identity. In
that case, the security interest may be continued in the prod-
uct if expressly claimed in the filed financing statement; if
not so claimed, the identifiable part will be treated as an
accession under section 9-314. When more than one security
interest attaches to the product or mass, the secured parties
share in proportion to their contribution.
Default
Part 5 of article 9 is designed to afford greater flexibility
and simplicity in the prescribed manner of liquidating the
122. U.C.C. §9-312(3).
123. See Planter's Bank v. Lummus Cotton Gin Co., 132 S.C. 16, 128
S.E. 876 (1925).
124. U.C.C. §9-314. Accord, Goodrich Silvertown, Inc. v. Rogers, 189
S.C. 101, 200 S.E. 91 (1938).
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collateral on default in payment of the secured debt. This
policy is balanced against the protection of the debtor's in-
terest that the collateral will realize its fair value. This ob-
jective is expressed in section 9-504 by the key standard for
the liquidation sale that it be "commercially reasonable."
Without an attempt at a specific definition of this term,
certain guidelines and minimum standards are prescribed for
the proper disposition of the collateral by the secured party.
It may be by public or private sale; with or without process-
ing; bulk or in parcels. Reasonable notice of the time and
place of the disposition must be given to the debtor and
other secured parties of record, unless the collateral is per-
ishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a
type customarily sold on a recognized market.
125
Code section 9-505 authorizes the secured party in the pos-
session of the collateral after default to retain the collateral
in satisfaction of the debt if the debtor, or any secured party
of record, does not object to such written proposal within
30 days after receipt. Where the collateral is consumer goods
and the debtor has paid 60% of the obligation, however, the
collateral must be disposed of within 90 days after the
secured party takes possession. If the secured party fails to
comply with this requirement where the collateral is con-
sumer goods, section 9-507 gives the debtor the right to re-
cover damages in an amount no less than the total credit
charge plus 10% of the debt.
CONCLUSION
The Uniform Commercial Code does not represent a revo-
lutionary change in principles and practice of commercial
law; it is an evolutionary step in the development of this
area of law. In some cases familiar answers to commercial
problems are given, sometimes with new terminology. Many
gaps in coverage under existing law are filled so that a
greater degree of predictability will be possible. When new
concepts and rules are introduced by the code, it is with the
objective that the law will more closely approximate modern
commercial needs and expectations. And, of course, the lawyer
would have a single place to look for many solutions to com-
mercial law problems which are presently scattered among a
number of different statutes and case decisions.
125. Cf. S.C. COD §45-164 (1962).
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The trend toward enactment of the Uniform Commercial
Code by the states so that it will truly establish uniform rules
governing commercial transacions in the near future has
been established. Of the twenty-six states which have passed
the code, twenty have done so within the past three years.
A further indication of an acceleration of this trend is the
fact that most of the states which are national or regional
centers of commerce and finance are now included among
the list of code states. It is significant that within two
years after Massachusetts (with Boston as the financial hub
of New England) enacted the code in 1958, the states of
Connecticut, New Hampshire and Rhode Island followed suit.
It would seem that the same kind of impetus would follow
from the enactment of the code in the past two years in the
more commercially important hub states of New York, Illinois,
Michigan, Ohio, and Georgia; the latter creating an increased
interest in the code among the southeastern states because of
their important commercial ties with Atlanta.
If it is to be assumed that change is the order of the day in
an industrially oriented space age and that law must adapt
to and change with the new facts of commercial practice, then
the syllogistic conclusion must follow that statutory and case
law rules set out yesterday may not always be appropriate
to solve problems of today and tomorrow. This leaves the
question of whether necessary change should come from
statutory law and, if so, whether the Uniform Commercial
Code offers the most appropriate collection of commercial
law rules for the present and immediate future. The final
verdict is, of course, in the hands of the legislature of each
state. As an attempt to state the law in terms of contemporary
commercial needs, the Uniform Commercial Code deserves the
attention and studied consideration of the General Assembly
of South Carolina.
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